Research Articles
Futurology
Value in Very Long Lives Journal of Moral Philosophy. 2016. https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-46810057 (Print version published in Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (4): 416–34. August 2017).
Featured article for PEA Soup discussion (April 2017).
The Termination Risks of Simulation Science Erkenntnis. 2018. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-0037-1 (Print version published in Erkenntnis 85 (2): 489–509. April 2020).
Section 4 published as an op-ed in The New York Times.
The Real-Life Issue of Prepunishment Social Theory and Practice. 48 (3): 507–23. July 2022.
The Consequentialist Problem with Prepunishment Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (3): 199–208. 2021.
Time Bias
Social Bias, Not Time Bias Politics, Philosophy & Economics. 2023. https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X231178506
Video Presentation for 8th Oxford Workshop on Global Priorities Research
‘Pure’ Time Preferences Are Irrelevant to the Debate over Time Bias: A Plea for Zero Time Discounting as the Normative Standard Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (3): 254–65. 2021.
Bias Towards the Future (with Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller, James Norton, Christian Tarsney, and Hannah Tierney) Philosophy Compass. 17 (8): 1–11. August 2022.
‘It Doesn't Matter Because One Day It Will End’ Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (1): 165–82. 2021.
Against Time Bias (with Meghan Sullivan) Ethics 125 (4): 947–70. 2015.
Featured article for PEA Soup Discussion (July 2015)
Time Bias — Experimental Philosophy
Hedonic and Non-Hedonic Bias Toward the Future (with Andrew Latham, Kristie Miller, and James Norton) Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 2020. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2019.1703017 (Print version published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (1): 148–63, 2021).
On Preferring That Overall, Things Are Worse: Future-Bias and Unequal Payoffs (with Andrew Latham, Kristie Miller, and James Norton) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 2021. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12819 (Print version published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (1): 181–94, July 2022).
The Implicit Decision Theory of Non-Philosophers (with Andrew Latham, Kristie Miller, and Michael Nielsen) Synthese, Forthcoming.
The Rationality of Near Bias Toward Both Future and Past Events (with Alex Holcombe, Andrew Latham, Kristie Miller, and James Norton) Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12: 905–22. 2021.
Capacity for Simulation and Mitigation Drives Hedonic and Non-Hedonic Time-Biases (with Andrew Latham, Kristie Miller, and James Norton) Philosophical Psychology 35 (2): 226–52. 2022.
How Much Do We Discount Past Pleasures? (with Andrew Latham, Kristie Miller, and James Norton) American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (4): 367–76. 2022.
Why Are People So Darned Past Biased? (with Andrew Latham, Kristie Miller, and James Norton) Temporal Asymmetries in Philosophy and Psychology, Oxford University Press. 2022. Edited by Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack and Alison Fernandes.
Decision Theory and Epistemology
What Matters in Psychological Continuity? Using Meditative Traditions to Identify Biases in Intuitions about Personal Persistence (with Meghan Sullivan) Experimental Philosophy of Identity and the Self, London: Bloomsbury. 2022. Edited by Kevin Tobia.
Act Consequentialism without Free Rides (with Ben Levinstein) Nous-Supplement: Philosophical Perspectives 34 (1): 88–116. 2020.
Success-First Decision Theories In Arif Ahmed (ed.), Newcomb's Problem, Cambridge University Press. 2018.
When Is A Belief True Because of Luck? Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252): 465–75. 2013.
For Popular Audiences
Are We Living in a Computer Simulation? Let’s Not Find Out The New York Times, August 2019. (See also www.nytimes.com/2019/08/16/opinion/letters/computer-simulation.html).
Interview on Morano in the Morning, AM 970 The Answer, New York City, August 2019.
Interview on The Wright Show, November 2019.
Interview on Thoughts that Count, April 2020.
Drafts
We Will All Live Forever
Among those who accept a secular and scientific worldview, it is mostly taken from granted that people die when their bodies stop functioning. This is, in fact, a feature of such a worldview that often serves to separate it from religious or spiritual ones. Yet, developments over the past several decades in theories of personal identity and cosmology — i.e., developments in our understanding of what we are like and what the universe is like — should cause us to rethink this assumption. First, there is the rise of psychological views of personal identity, which understand people not as bodies but as psychologies, and which take what we are to be independent of any particular substrate. Second, most physicists have come to view the universe as infinite. In this paper, I argue that those who accept these views should be far from certain of their own mortality. Most ambitiously, I argue that the best psychological view — Derek Parfit's — when combined with the most popular cosmological view, guarantees immortality.
Dissertation
Rationality and Success (2013)